Yesterday, I talked about the validity of the senses, and the revolutionary nature of Rand's approach to it. Over the next few days, I will expand on the subject by talking about a very common theory of mind among Objectivists: Harry Binswanger's "Direct Realism". I will explain why it is wrong, and how it contradicts, not only Rand's ideas, but the very aspect that made them revolutionary in the first place.
Direct Realism treats the issue of relating percept to object as the result of an incorrect conceptualization of perception itself. According to Binswanger, the notion of a "content of perception", defined by both an external object and the nature of our senses, is wrong. To him, the proper conceptualization is that of an external object, and the form by which we perceive it. Perception is valid because only the form, and not the object, depends on our nature. To assume that there is a "content of perception" would be to assume the existence of a mental entity, which is a contradiction in terms.
The problem with this view is that it violates the hierarchy of knowledge. The very idea of "an external object" identifies an independent existent, that causes our perception, yet is distinct from it. It does not presuppose two distinct entities, but two distinct existents - one physical and one mental - with a specific relationship to one another. To explain the validity of the senses is to explain the nature of that relationship.
To say that perception is valid because it is, by definition, the perception of an object is not to explain it, but to dismiss the discussion entirely. In that sense, it is closer to the intrinsicist "because god" approach than to Rand's, who acknowledged the distinction, and saw it as an aspect of knowledge rather than a reason to reject it. This rather general difference gives rise to a very specific problem: Binswanger's claim that mental phenomena like dreams and hallucinations are not forms of perception, because they are not forms of perceiving entities.
Perception is valid because it is caused both by the nature of our perceptual mechanism and of the objects that interact with it. Our conceptual faculty allows us to integrate those perceptions, differentiate between their internal and external causes, and thus gain knowledge about both. My own childhood provides a good example: I still remember the exact moment when I identified that "some things seem smaller because they are far". Differentiating between the internal cause (the nature of vision), and external causes (size and distance) of my perceptions allowed me to understand that my movement towards an object does not cause its actual growth.
Dreams and hallucinations are automatic interactions between our sense organs and objective existents, just like "normal perception" - and are just as valid, for the same reason. It is not the hallucination of a dragon itself which is invalid, but the conceptual belief that this perception is caused by an actual dragon, and not by the abnormal nature of one's consciousness. The same is true of dreams - and explaining their relationship to reality is one of the trickiest questions in psychology.
Binswanger's Direct Realism dismisses the issue of explaining the relationship between perception and reality altogether. I base it on the causal relationship between perception, object and our perceptual mechanism. Because it is caused by both, perception is always analogous to both - which is why I call this approach "Analog Realism". I will delve deeper into the differences between the two theories tomorrow, when I talk about sensations.
1271.523 SRY